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Julie Cupples does geographers a great service by naming
and analysing the effects of “geoscientisation,” a pattern
of institutional reorganisation whereby former Depart-
ments or Institutes of Geography are brought together in
larger academic units with physical science disciplines
like geology, earth sciences or environmental sciences
(Cupples, MS 1). Geoscientisation, Cupples argues, exac-
erbates the more general effects of the neoliberalization
of higher education of which it is a part, and tends to
marginalise, render invisible and/or delegitimate critical
human geography in particular. “[A]sserting our right to
analyse our working conditions,” as Cupples does with
this paper, is simultaneously more difficult and more
necessary than ever (Cupples, MS 10).
My comments here are based on my own experi-
ences and conversations with colleagues in North
America and Europe. Much of the material I draw
upon is very “grey”: snippets of conversations among
others overheard in the hallway, brief comments in fac-
ulty meetings, sotto voce whisperings during lectures by
visiting scholars, and the like. As critical human geog-
raphers know, these genres, marginal though they may
seem, are the very stuff of what we hypostatize as
“institutional culture.” And culture is the central ques-
tion here. A second preliminary note is in order as
well: many of the issues discussed below concern atti-
tudes that largely remain latent, simmering beneath
the surface of institutional culture. To the credit of
many of my physical science colleagues, they only sel-
dom break out into the open in ways that could do con-
crete harm. Nevertheless, their pervasive presence is in
itself already a burden and a low-level threat that, as
Cupples rightly insists, we ignore at our peril.
In Germany, where I now work, it is not so much
geoscientisation as a process but rather the condition of
being in a geosciences unit that is the problem. Many
institutes of geography in Germany have always been
closely integrated with physical geosciences. At my uni-
versity, the impacts of living in the geosciences are com-
pounded by the fact that the geosciences are in turn
located within a larger faculty composed also of chemis-
try and biology. Most importantly, it is at the faculty level
that binding decisions on hiring or the awarding of post-
graduate degrees are made.
The often quite subtle forms of “epistemic erasure”
attendant on geoscientisation are the product of a perva-
sive “lack of understanding of contemporary human
geography” (Cupples, MS 4) on the part of most physical
colleagues and of institutional and cultural power struc-
tures through which this ignorance is allowed to persist
and even flourish. I would supplement the examples
Cupples gives with a series of brief observations about
this “epistemic erasure” and “lack of understanding.” Of
course the degree of understanding—and the degree of
openness to serious engagement with human-geographic
scholarship—varies among colleagues on the natural sci-
ence side. Nevertheless, beneath individual variation run
some cultural issues that can be thought of as facets of a
“style of thought” (Fleck, 1981 [1935]).
First, a “lack of understanding of contemporary
human geography” by itself is not necessarily a problem.
Many human geographers do not understand large
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swathes of contemporary physical geography. Yet we do
not typically (in my experience, ever) challenge the scien-
tific value of physical subdiscipines or the judgement of
our physical colleagues on matters within their range of
professional competency. In other words, the issue here
is whether our physical colleagues assume that human
geographic subdisciplines or discourses about which they
(often admittedly) know little or nothing are prima facie
deserving of respect. The danger of having physical scien-
tists involved in hiring decisions, and perhaps even more,
decisions on the awarding of doctoral (and in Germany,
Habilitation or “second doctorate”) degrees in human
geography lies not just in the fact that these colleagues
“lack the ability to properly evaluate performance”
(Cupples, MS 6). It lies also in the fact that some of them
do not believe it is important that they lack this ability. In
this posture, everyday common sense plus untutored
opinions are assumed to be an adequate basis at least for
broad judgments on work in subfields of human geogra-
phy. A second, closely related tendency is the dismissal
or trivialization of specialised human geographic con-
cepts and theories as “jargon.” Here, too, a surprisingly
unscientific attitude holds sway: even where some
physical colleagues are willing to admit that they know
nothing of a particular debate or discourse, they may still
assume that the burden of proof lies with human geogra-
phers to justify their specialised vocabularies and theoret-
ical perspectives, not upon those like themselves who
have not read a single word of the relevant literatures.
A third point also has to do with insufficient reflexiv-
ity. Cupples is entirely right to argue that another, related
major negative effect of geoscientisation is the perpetua-
tion of sexist and racist academic cultures. Part of this of
course has to do with gendered and crypto-colonial
aspects of the discourse of scientific “neutrality” and the
“lack of bias” of scientific procedure, as well as with the
blinkered notion that scientific communication has noth-
ing to do with power but is reducible merely to the
undistorted communication of facts. Additionally, the
belief of some natural scientists that their casual impres-
sions about human geographic work are sufficient goes
hand in hand with a general attitude of annoyance or
open hostility toward the foregrounding of racism, sexism
and other forms of oppression as problems. These col-
leagues, including some women, “mean well” and do not
knowingly engage in racist or sexist behaviours, and so
they believe that they are not part of the problem. Despite
most of them not having faced racism, or not necessarily
having a stake in recognising the sexism around them,
they nevertheless feel competent to pronounce ex cathe-
dra that “political correctness” and respectful speech are
inappropriate for addressing racism and sexism, and even
harmful to scientific freedom. In Germany and some
other European countries, this naïveté is inextricably
bound up with the still very prevalent idealised subject-
position of The Professor as a quasi-omniscient, rational
being able to bracket “normative” or “emotional” factors.
The colleagues who follow this pattern display a glaring
gap in their understanding when they fancy themselves
“objective” and “rational” even while visibly overcome, in
exchanges about racism or sexism, by strong affects and
emotions ranging from annoyance to outright rage. Much
of this can readily be recognised as an expression of white
(but also often mainstream masculine) “fragility,” and in
Germany is unfortunately not entirely restricted to the
physical sciences (DiAngelo, 2018).
Like Cupples and the many colleagues she has con-
sulted, I find dealing with these and other manifestations
of cultural difference utterly draining. Despite my own
position of compound intersectional privilege, it is a
constant fight not to become completely discouraged at
the effects of living in the geosciences (and natural sciences
more generally). So I can fully appreciate the underlying
logic of her argument, which pulls in the direction of advo-
cating a sort of institutional “safe space” for critical human
geography, even, if necessary, at the expense of splitting off
from physical geography. I often yearn for such a safe
space, or at least a space where I and my human geography
colleagues can just get on with our research.
Nevertheless, for those of us stuck in situations not
likely to be alleviated anytime soon by the kind of
favourable changes that have taken place at Macquarie,
Monash, Wollongong or St. Andrews (Cupples MS 8–9),
an exclusively separatist “politics of refusal” by itself will
not solve our problems, and in some circumstances could
worsen our institutional situation (Cupples MS 10).
Cupples acknowledges the need for establishing some
kind of constructive modus operandi in her decision to
work with physical geography colleagues on specific pro-
jects. A more specific downside of too strong a separatist
line, in my view, would be a tendency to relegate quanti-
tative methods to the “bad” side of the divide (Cupples
MS 3, 9). As Cupples rightly points out, critical human
geographers working in a geosciences context are often
pressed by physical colleagues to defend their critical stance
toward a naïve positivist epistemology long consigned to
the dustbin by philosophers of science (Cupples MS 8). But
quantification does not equal naïve positivism, as evidenced
by an already long tradition in human geography compris-
ing critical quantification (e.g., Brown & Knopp, 2006;
Dorling, 2015; Forest, 2012; Mattingly & Falconer-Al
Hindi, 1995), “strategic positivism” (Hannah, 2001; Wyly,
2009), critical cartography and visualisation (e.g., Crampton,
2006; Krygier, 1997; Kwan, 1999) and related areas. Perhaps
this is one area, along with, for example, critical approaches
to climate change and the anthropocene, in which human
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geographers can embark on a more dialectical project of
transforming the cultural discourses and practices of the
geosciences from within.
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